How Do You Maximize Expectation Value? JOHN L. POLLOCK UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA
It is generally supposed that when the relevant probabilities and utilities are known, the theory of rational decision is simple. What it prescribes is performing that act which maximizes expectation value. More precisely:
A person should (rationally) perform an act iff the expectation value of his doing so is greater than the expectation value of his performing any alternative act.
This principle is often associated with Thomas Bayes, although it goes back at least to Daniel Bernouli (1730), and is accepted uncritically by most of contemporary decision theory. The purpose of this paper is to consider just what this recommendation amounts to, and whether it is reasonable.
There are well known difficulties attendant to the notions of probability, utility, and expectation value, but let us accept those notions uncritically for now. There remains serious difficulties for understanding the recommendation that we perform any act whose expectation value is greater than the expectation value of any alternative act. The specific problem I have in mind concerns what counts as an "alternative act."'' The simplest answer would result in the following principle of rationality:
(1) A is rationally obligatory iff A has a higher expecation value than any act incompatible with A; A is rationally permissible iff the expectation value of A is at least as great as that of any act incompatible with A; where two acts are incompatible iff it is impossible to perform both, and an act is rationally permissible iff it is not rationally obligatory to refrain from performing it. It is rather easy to see that (1) is incorrect. Suppose we have three levers, a, b, c, and A, B, and C are the acts of depressing a, b, and c, respectively. Levers a and b are linked together so that if either is depressed the other cannot be depressed. Lever c can be depressed independently of the other two. Let us suppose that A, B, and C have positive expectation values EA, EB, and EC. Suppose further that EA = EB, and that the results of depressing b and c are independent of one another in such a way that the expectation value of depressing both (act BC) is: EBC = EB + EC. 2 It seems clear that it is rationally permissible to perform either A or B in this example. But EA < EBC, and BC is incompatible with A, so it follows from (1) that one is rationally obligated to refrain from performing A. That seems clearly wrong. The difficulty is that BC is not the sort of act that should be compared with A. The inclusion of C in the comparison introduces a source of expectation value which is irrelevant to whether one ought to perform A. We could replace A in this reasoning by any act unrelated to B and C, with the result that we could conclude of any such act that it is not rationally obligatory.
The preceding difficulty suggests that rather than comparing the expectation value of an act with arbitrarily complex alternative acts, we should just compare it with the expectation value of refraining from performing the act. Let A be the act of refraining from performing A.3 The proposal is then:
(2) A is rationally obligatory iff the expectation value of A is greater than that of A.
This principle also fails. Modifying the previous example, let us suppose that the only relevant ways of acquiring utility are by performing A or B, and that because we are not totally rational creatures, the probability of our performing A if we do not perform B is less than 1 and the probability of our performing B if we do not perform A is also less than 1. In that event, EA> B -and EB> B -4 Thus it is rationally obligatory to perform both A and B. But that cannot be right, because they are incompatible. I assume the following principle of the consistency of rationality:
If each member of a set of acts is rationally obligatory (at t) then it must be possible (at t) to perform them all.5
By virtue of this principle (2) cannot be correct.
If we are to make sense of the notion of comparing A with "alternative acts," we require a notion of alternativeness according to which alternative acts are in some sense "on the same level" as far as how much they include. A includes too little, and BC includes too much. It is not at all clear how to make this precise, but it is fairly easy to see that it would not provide a general solution to our problem even if we could make it precise. The difficulty is that there may be no acts which are, in the appropriate sense, alternative to A. For instance, in our example of the three levers, let us suppose that levers a, b, and c are linked to mechanisms giving us non-interacting utilities (e.g., monetary payoffs) Ua, Ub, and U, respectively, and that Ub < Ua < Ub + U. There are linkages which prevent a and b from both being depressed, and which require that c be depressed in order to depress b. c is independent of a. Clearly, it is rational to depress a in this example. One should in fact depress both a and c. But there is no act which is in the appropriate sense an alternative to A and with which A should be compared in determining whether A should be performed. In order to depress b one must also depress c, so EB = Ub + UC. EA = Ua + UC * prob(C/A), so let us suppose that prob(C/A) < 1 -(Ua -Ub)/UC. Returning to (3), to talk of "doing A while doing everything else so as to maximize expectation value while doing A" is to talk about a strategy which prescribes doing A and directs the rest of your actions, present and future, in such a way as to maximize expectation value. Such a strategy is a maximal strategy. It tells us precisely what to do in all possible present and future circumstances. To make this precise, let us say that a world history is the history of a possible world up to some point. Then a maximal strategy can be regarded as a function which to each world history assigns a consistent set of acts. The latter are the acts prescribed by the strategy in that situation. The expectation value of a strategy at a given time is the expected utility of conforming to the strategy from that time on. To compare the results of doing A and doing everything else so as to maximize expectation value with the results of not doing A and doing everything else so as to maximize expecation value isjust to compare maximal strategies including A with those not including A.7 It then seems that (3) can be made more precise as follows:
A is rationally obligatory iJf A is included in some maximal strategy which has a higher expectation value than any maximal strategy which does not include A.
More generally, we can talk of non-maximal strategies being included in maximal strategies,8 and generalize (3) as follows: (4) A strategy S is rational obligatory iff S is included in some maximal strategy which has a higher expectation value than any maximal strategy which does not include S.
There is a convenient reformulation of (4). (4) evaluates maximal strategies in terms of expectation values, and then evaluates non-maximal strategies in terms of the evaluation of maximal strategies including them. Thus we can replace (4) by the following pair of principles, where A is either an act or a strategy, or a refraining from an act or a strategy: (5) A is rationally obligatory iff A is prescribed by some maximal strategy which is rationally preferable to any maximal strategy which does not prescribe A.
(6) One maximal strategy is rationally preferable to another iff the first has a higher expectation value than the second.
(5) and (6) are reminiscent of rule utilitarianism, although maximal strategies are more complex than anything which might realistically be considered a rule. There is something which should make us at least suspicious of this account. According to this account we decide whether to perform an act by comparing maximal strategies. But maximal strategies are extremely complex, even infinitely complex, and it does not seem that we ordinarily do anything quite so complicated as this in deciding what to do. Although we have seen that it cannot work in general, at least frequently we seem to just compare the expectation values of individual acts. How can we reconcile this with with complexities of (5) and (6)?
The answer is that (5) and (6) do not give an entirely correct account of rational decision. This is most easily seen as follows. Given a maximal strategy S and time t, let us say that the truncated strategy St is the non-maximal strategy consisting of all the prescriptions of S up to time t. To follow St is just to follow S up to time t. Letting E(St) be the expectation value of following St up to t, the following principle seems intuitively correct:
(7) A maximal strategy S is preferable to another S# if for every time t, E(St) > E(S#t).
In other words, given two maximal strategies, if as they unfold the first always has a higher expectation value than the second, then the first is rationally perferable to the second. But this is compatible with the two strategies having the same total expectation values. If the marginal expectation value E(St+A) -E(St) never quite goes to zero, but E(S) is finite, then E(St) approaches E(S) asymptotically. E(St) and E(St#) may both approach the same limit asymptotically despite the latter being everywhere less than the former. Then according to (7), S is rationally preferable to S#, whereas by (6) neither is preferable to the other. In a case like this in which (6) and (7) conflict, it seems to me that (7) gives the right answer. Given a choice between S and S#, if you chose S# then you would spend your entire life trying to catch up with someone who chose S. Surely it would be more rational to choose S. This difficulty is connected with the observation that in concrete decisions in real life we do not seem to weigh maximal strategies against one another. Often we weigh individual acts against one another, or more generally we weigh truncated strategies against one another. (An individual act is the limiting case of a truncated strategy.) Let us say that the period of a truncated strategy St is the time t to which the strategy extends. Often we seem to judge that we should perform A on the grounds that it is prescribed by a truncated strategy St (which may just say "Do A") which (1) has a higher expectation value than any other truncated strategy with the same period and (2) will not cut us off from any future opportunities for acquiring utility which would be available to us if we followed an alternative truncated strategy.9 For example, suppose I am deciding whether to eat the piece of choclate cake on the plate before me. If I am not overweight or allergic to chocolate, the hostess will not be offended by my not eating it, etc., then (2) is satisfied and the question whether to eat the cake turns entirely on the question whether any other act immediately available to me has a higher expectation value. More generally, in place of (2) it suffices to have (2*): if following St would cut us off from some future opportunities for acquiring utility which would be available to us if we followed an alternative truncated strategy, then it replaces them with some other opportunities that are at least as good.
I suggest that the way to make this precise is to talk about extending a truncated strategy by adding prescriptions onto the end of it to extend its period to a later time. What (1) and (2*) amount to is that it be possible systematically to extend St to truncated strategies St* for later and later times to in such a way that for every alternative truncated strategy S* , the expectation value of St* is greater than that of St*. The result of this systematic extension is a maximal strategy S of which each St. is a truncation. An equivalent way of putting this is to reaffirm (5) but require: (8) A maximal strategy S is rational preferable to another S* iff there is a time to such that for every time t later than to, E(St) > E(St#).
If the expectation value of S is greater than that of S#, then S is preferable to S# by (8), but the converse fails. The point of only requiring that the expectations of truncations of S be greater than those of truncations of S # after some initial period to is to allow a rational agent to take a short term loss in order to achieve a long term gain. It might seem that we should allow the process to repeat, allowing E(St) to repeatedly dip below E(St#), just as long as it eventually catches up and surpasses the latter again. If this happens only finitely many times then it is already accomodated by (8)-we just let to be the point at which S finally surpasses S# for good. But if this goes on happening forever, then the relation between S and S# is symmetrical. Each can be viewed as falling behind and then surpassing the other infinitely many times. In that case there is no reason to perfer one of the strategies to the other.
The combination of (5) and (8) explains why we can often just compare the expectation values of isolated acts A and B. This is because we often have reason to believe that for any maximal strategy S with a reasonably high expectation value, we can interchange A and B in the strategy without affecting the expectation value of the strategy except for that part of the expectation value which results directly from doing A or doing B. The reason we cannot always compare isolated acts is that this interchangeability condition may fail and in the last analysis it is maximal strategies that are to be compared and not acts.
As further confirmation of (8), notice that it is only a contingent fact that human beings have a finite life expectancy. Suppose there were a race of Methusalehs who lived for ever. It might then happen that any halfway reasonable maximal strategy would have an infinite expectation value-it wouldjust keep picking up more and more utility as it unfolded. (6) would have the consequence that there would be nothing to choose between such strategies. But that seems clearly wrong. We might have two such strategies S and S# such that for all times t, the expectation value of St was one million times that of St*. A Methusaleh who followed S# would be irrational. It is (8) which explains why that is the case.
It seems to me that the combination of (5) and (8) comes close to constituting an adequate account of rational decision making in ordinary cases, but one final sophistication is required. We must consider what we mean by 'act' (and hence what the components of strategies are). Our ordinary understanding of 'act' is such that pushing a button during a certain temporal interval (for example, while a light is on) would be considered an act. But if the interval is sufficiently short, it may be quite improbable that we can actually perform the act if we try. This is relevant to decision problems in the following way. Suppose we have a choice between pushing button a now and receiving five utiles, or waiting until a light flashes and pushing button b while the light is on. If we succeed in the latter task we receive 100 utiles. Which we should do depends upon how likely we are to be able to push b while the light is on. Thus it is not just the expectation value of pushing b at the right time that is relevant, but also the probability of being able to push b at the right time.
The normal procedure in decision theory is to avoid this problem by requiring that acts be things we are able to do with certainty. This is to rule that most ordinary acts are not to be considered acts for the purposes of decision theory. In many cases, trying to perform an act becomes an act. But in cases like the preceding one in which we must decide between doing something now (pushing a) and doing something later (pushing b when the light comes on), there may be nothing corresponding to the later act which we are certain to be able to do. In particular, we might be unable to even try to push b when the light comes on, because we might be asleep, or injured, or sick, etc. Thus it does not seem that our problem can be solved by restricting acts to things that we can do with certainty.
It is strategies that must be compared in decision problems. Strategies are (roughly) sequences of acts. We cannot solve our problem by identifying them with sequences of tryings, but we might instead talk about the expectation value of trying to conform to the strategy (as opposed to the expectation value of actually conforming to the strategy). That is not quite the correct way of doing things, because trying to conform to a strategy is an ongoing process. Trying hard in the beginning might lead one to try less hard in the future. But we can talk instead about undertaking to conform to a strategy (i.e., forming the intention to conform to it), where this is something one does now (even if the strategy does not call for the performance of any particular acts until later). The expectation value of undertaking to conform to a strategy takes into account not only the likelihood that one will actually succeed in conforming to it, but also the relative likelihoods of what one will do instead if one does not succeed in conforming to the strategy. My proposal is then that in (8) and elsewhere, when we talk about the expectation value of a strategy, we take this to be the expectation value of undertaking to conform to the strategy-not the expectation value of actually conforming to the strategy.
Our revised understanding of the expectation value of a strategy has two important consequences. First, strategies can be infinitely complex-so complex that we cannot even conceive of them. Such an infinitely complex strategy might be such that the expectation value of conforming to it is higher than the expectation value of conforming to any other strategy. If we cannot even conceive of this strategy, then surely the fact that it prescribes a certain act is not enough to make that act rationally obligatory for us. This problem can be solved by observing that if we cannot conceive of a strategy, then we cannot undertake it either, in which case the expectation value of undertaking it can rea-sonably be taken to be zero. What the strategy prescribes then becomes irrelevant.
A second consequence is that we must revise our understanding of what it is for an act to be rationally obligatory. If it is unlikely that we will be able to perform an act even if we try (e.g., pushing a button just as a light flashes on) but the payoff is correspondingly high, then even though it is unlikely that we will be able to perform the act it may be worth trying. By (5) and (8), the act may then be rationally obligatory. But if it is unlikely that we can perform the act, we would not ordinarily judge that we should perform the act-only that we should try to perform it. In general, I suggest that in decision theory, what we should mean by saying that an act is rationally obligatory is that one rationally should try to perform it.10 II I suspect that in all realistic cases, (5) and (8) provide the correct solutions to decision problems."I There remain theoretical difficulties for them, however, associated with some decision-theoretic paradoxes. Suppose we have some type of act which can only be done once, but the longer it is postponed the greater the expectation value for doing it. Then (5) and (8) would council never doing it, because for each strategy prescribing doing it at a particular time, there is a strategy with higher expectation value which prescribes doing it at a later time. For example, a bottle of fine wine normally improves with age for a while, but then goes bad. Consider, however, a bottle of EverBetter Wine which continues to get better forever. When should we drink it? (5) and (8) imply that for each time t, we should not drink the wine at t, because a perferable strategy would prescribe drinking it at t+ A for some A. On the other hand, for any time t, a strategy prescribing that we drink the wine at t will be rationally perferable to one prescribing that we never drink the wine, so by (5) and (8) it is rationally obligatory that we drink the wine at some time,'2 but also rationally obligatory that we not drink it at each particular time. In other words, (5) and (8) issue inconsistent prescriptions and hence conflict with the principle of the consistency of rationality.13 It follows that they must be incorrect.
Cases of this sort are paradoxical because it is not at all clear what we are rationally obligated to do in them. Each piece of reasoning in accordance with (5) and (8) is intuitively compelling, but the reasoning is collectively absurd. It seems that no amount of reflection on these cases enlightens us regarding what we ought to do.
It is worth noting that there are many paradoxical cases having this same general structure. They do not all involve time, and there are even some that do not involve probability (i.e., the probabilities are all one). For example, in Yosemite National Park there are some dome shaped hills that become progressively steeper as you descend their sides. A favorite pastime of some young men is descending as far as one dares short of reaching the critical point at which one will begin sliding and fall to one's death. Consider such a person and suppose he gets a greater thrill (more utility) the further he descends short of the critical point. (5) and (8) prescribe that for each point short of the critical point, he should descend further, but he should not descend to the critical point. These prescriptions are jointly inconsistent. A similar example would concern a person leaning further and further over a abyss.14.
When I reflect upon what I would actually do when faced with these paradoxical situations, I find that I would quickly give up reasoning and just randomly pick a point at which to perform the act (drink the wine, stop descending, stop leaning, etc.). This suggests that perhaps the most reasonable course is to follow what is called a "mixed strategy." To simplify the mathematics, suppose we have only a discrete set of points at which we can perform the act. For example, we might choose a countable set of points asymptotically approaching the critical point on the domed hill, and consider stopping at each of those points. Or we might consider a countable set of times (e.g., once a week) at which we might drink the wine. This simplification will not affect the general point being made. Let the set of these points be {xk}, and let Uk be the utility resulting from performing A at Xk. Then we consider a device of some sort (a "randomizer") which selects some integer for us. The probability of its choosing an integer k is Pk. The mixed strategy is then to perform A at the point xk such that k is selected by the randomizer. The probability of performing A at Xk given that you are following the mixed strategy is Pk. Thus the expectation value of following the mixed strategy is kY. Uk * Pk. It is easily demonstrated that if we have only finitely many alternatives to consider, a mixed strategy can never be preferable to a strategy prescribing the particular alternative having the highest expectation value. But the situation changes when, as here, there are infinitely many alternatives. For example, suppose Uk = 2k+1 and Pk = 1/2k+1. For any particular k, a maximal strategy prescribing that we perform A at xk need not have an infinite expectation value because the prescription to do A at xk only contributes an expectation value of Uk to the total. But it is easily demonstrated that a maximal strategy which includes this mixed strategy will have an infinite expectation value (unless other parts of the strategy generate infinite negative expectation). This is because Uk Pk = 1, and hence kY. Uk Pk = ao. Thus it seems that a maximal strategy which includes the mixed strategy may be rationally perferable to any other strategy.
Unfortunately, appealing to mixed strategies does not really solve our problem. It only confounds the problem. First, it can easily be shown that mixed strategies cannot help us if, for example, Uk = k. In that case, no matter how P is chosen, the expectation value of the mixed strategy will be finite and hence there will always be infinitely many maximal strategies prescribing doing A at particular xk's which are preferable to the maximal strategy containing the mixed strategy. The only times mixed strategies help is when they generate infinite expectation values. That in itself seems very odd.
But what is even worse is that in those cases in which the mixed strategies do generate infinite expectation values, (5) and (8) violate the dominance principle: (9) IfS and S# are maximal strategies and it is certain that following S will result in greater utility than following S#, then S is rationally preferable to S#*.15
To see this, suppose we have a particular randomizer and construct our maximal strategy S to contain the mixed strategy described above. Construct S# by replacing the mixed strategy with a new mixed strategy which uses the same randomized but prescribes doing A at xk+1 (rather than Xk) if the randomizer chooses k. Because Uk+1 > Uk for every k, you will achieve greater utility by following this strategy regardless of what number is chosen by the randomizer. But the expectation values which the mixed strategies contribute to the maximal strategies containing them will be the same-both are infinite. Thus by (8) neither strategy is preferable to the other, but by (9) S# is preferable to S. The dominance principle seems undeniable, so this appears to constitute a serious objection to (8).
My inclination is to say that in these paradoxical cases, reason cannot help us. Reason cannot lead us to a decision regarding what to do. Accordingly, no act is rationally obligatory. This can be accomodated by reconstruing (5), taking it to define the notion rA is presumptively rationally obligatory, and then requiring:
(10) A is rationally obligatory iff A is presumptively rationally obligatory and there is no set of presumptively rationally obligatory strategies which is inconsistent with A.
This has the result that in our paradoxical cases we are rationally permitted to do A at any Xk. For example, it is all right to drink the wine whenever we feel like it.
It is worth emphasizing that all of these paradoxical cases are non-realistic in important ways. The wine example requires that the wine get better without limit, and do so rapidly enough to counteract the decrease in expectation value normally resulting from the extreme improbability of our surviving to very great ages (e.g., one millon years). The example of the domed hill assumes that the climber has perfect control over how far he descends, but that is unrealistic. The expectation value does not really continue to increase indefinitely as one approaches the critical point. Rather, once one is sufficiently close to the critical point the danger of slipping or being blown over it by the wind causes the expectation value to decrease. These features of the examples are unrealistic, but only contingently so. The examples illustrate logically possible difficulties for (5) and (8), and hence show that (5) and (8) are not logically necessary, but they are not difficulties that are apt to arise in practice. I am inclined to think that (5) and (8) are entirely adequate for handling all actual decision problems. NOTES 'Although I find that people are aware of this problem, there is very little discussion of it in the literature. There is some discussion of the analogous problem for the formulation of utilitarianism. In this connection see [1] , and the references cited there. See also [6] , [3] , [5] , and [2] . 21 mean by this that the outcomes of B and C are independent in such a way that neither affects the value of the other. Even given this assumption, it may be denied that EBC = EB + Ec. Whether this equality holds depends upon precisely how one defines expectation value. One natural response to Newcomb's Paradox is to require outcomes to be causally related to acts, in which case the equality does hold in this case (although the equality does not hold in general). But a more traditional definition yields only that EBC ' EB. This does not affect the point of the example, however.
3For the sake of discussing this problem, I assume that for any act A there is the act A of refraining from performing A. But that is not a principle to which I want to commit myself. Together with the principle that given any two acts A and B there is the act AB of performing both A and B, this implies that there is also the disjunctive act AvB of performing at least one of A or B. I find this conclusion at least peculiar. Thus for the purposes of this paper I prefer to remain neutral on the question whether negations and disjunctions of acts are always acts. This will make no difference to the final analysis, because that proceeds in terms of strategies and we can always achieve the effect of disjunctive acts in terms of strategies. 4Robert Stalnaker has objected (in correspondence) that there is something illegitimate about computing EX in terms of the probabilities of performing other acts if we do not perform A. His suggestion is that in deciding whether to perform A, we should assume that if we do not perform A then we will perform the optimal alternative. But that is circular. It presupposes the notion of an alternative act, and that is precisely the notion we are trying to clarify. 5The need to index rational obligatoriness and possibility to times follows from Holly Goldman's discussion in [3] .
6Note that regardless of whether there are disjunctive acts, we can get the effect of talking about them by talking about strategies instead. For example, the putative disjunctive act AvB could be identified with the strategy "Do A if you do not do B." 7To say that a maximal strategy includes A is to say that A is contained in the set of acts the strategy assigns to the world histroy of the actual world up to this time.
8A non-maximal strategy S is included in a maximal strategy S# iff for every circumstance yin the domain of S and for every world history H including y, S(y) 5 S (H).
9(1) and (2) are not independent of one another. The expectation value of a truncated strategy is affected by what future opportunities it forecloses.
101f the probability that one can succeed in performing an act is sufficiently high, then we are often willing to go on to conclude that one should perform it, and notjust that one should try to perform it. But I am not sure that this is not just a confusion.
11In [5] , Michael McKinsey makes a plausible case for the view that we must distinguish between different levels of obligation. He is talking about moral obligation, but this point seems equally applicable to rational obligation. (5) and (8) should then be viewed as a theory of first-level obligation.
12Drinking the wine at some time is presumably not an act, but it can be regarded as refraining from the strategy which says, "For each time t, do not drink the wine at t." It is refraining from this non-maximal strategy which is rationally obligatory.
13This requires that the principle of the consistency of rationality be extended to include strategies as well as acts, but that is presumably unproblematic.
14The referee pointed out to me that Leibniz' God would have a similar problem if for every world there were a better world, and if any world were better than no world.
I As Richard Jeffrey observes ([4]: 8-10), a formulation of the dominance principle which is both precise and correct must include a causal independence assumption, but that does not affect the present use of the principle.
